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FEDERALISM DOCTRINES AND ABORTION CASES: 
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR FALLON 
ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR.* 
INTRODUCTION 
In his Article If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a 
Post-Roe World,1 Professor Richard Fallon argues that if the Supreme Court 
were to overrule Roe v. Wade,2 courts might well remain in the “abortion-
umpiring business.”3  It is imaginable, he explains—perhaps even likely—that, 
post-Roe, state and federal actors would regulate abortion in ways raising 
serious constitutional questions.  States might attempt to regulate abortions 
beyond their borders, or Congress might enact a national abortion regulation.4  
Such acts, if they occurred, could give rise to serious constitutional questions 
of federal and state authority to regulate.5 
Professor Fallon surely is correct that in a post-Roe world state and federal 
actors might seek to regulate abortion in ways that would raise serious 
constitutional questions.6  An important question that follows upon his thesis, 
however, is the extent to which in analyzing these questions the Court would 
engage in the same kind of constitutional analysis in which it has engaged in 
Roe and its progeny—that is, an analysis balancing a state’s interests in 
protecting life against a pregnant woman’s interests in choosing to terminate 
her pregnancy.  In both Roe and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of abortion 
 
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law; John Cardinal O’Hara, C.S.C. 
Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. 
 1. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a Post-
Roe World, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 611 (2007). 
 2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 3. Professor Fallon thus responds to Justice Scalia’s observation in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey that overturning Roe would remove the courts from the 
“abortion-umpiring business.”  505 U.S. 833, 996 (1992). 
 4. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 613. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See id. at 611–14. 
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regulations with reference to standards specifically tailored to account for state 
and individual interests in the practice of abortion.7 
The fact, however, that a case involves abortion does not necessarily mean 
that the Court would resolve it under the kind of balancing standard that it 
applied in Roe and Casey.  In Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont,8 for 
example, a nonprofit corporation that urged alternatives to abortion argued that 
the Federal Election Campaign Act was unconstitutional insofar as it banned 
corporate contributions in certain federal elections.9  Though the case related to 
abortion, the Court resolved it with reference not to competing state and 
individual interests in the practice of abortion, but to First Amendment 
principles governing the constitutionality of restrictions on campaign 
contributions.10  Thus, in addition to abortion-related cases that the Court has 
resolved according to standards tailored to account for competing interests in 
the practice of abortion (what I call “abortion-dependent” standards), there are 
abortion-related cases that the Court has resolved according to standards that 
account for interests that are not specific to the practice of abortion (what I call 
“non-abortion-dependent” standards). 
This is not to say that it is easy to classify all abortion-related cases as 
involving either an abortion-dependent or a non-abortion-dependent standard.  
There are cases relating to abortion that the Court has professed to resolve 
according to non-abortion-dependent standards but that, it has been argued, the 
Court really resolved according to abortion-dependent standards.  In Madsen v. 
Women’s Health Center,11 for instance, the Court had to select the appropriate 
First Amendment test for analyzing the constitutionality of an injunction 
against anti-abortion protestors.12  The Court professed to select the test it did 
(“the challenged provisions of the injunction [must] burden no more speech 
than necessary to serve a significant government interest” rather than survive 
“strict scrutiny”) according to a non-abortion-dependent principle, namely that 
 
 7. In Roe, the Court balanced a state’s interest “in protecting potential life” against a 
woman’s interest in having a choice to decide “whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”  410 
U.S. at 153–54; see id. at 154 (“We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy 
includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered 
against important state interests in regulation.”).  In Casey, the plurality analyzed the 
constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute regulating abortion by balancing “the State’s interest in 
life” and “the right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy.”  505 U.S. at 869.  The plurality 
determined that “a law designed to further the State’s interest in fetal life” may not impose “an 
undue burden on the woman’s decision before fetal viability.”  Id. at 877.  A majority of the 
Supreme Court applied this “undue burden” test in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 8. 539 U.S. 146 (2003). 
 9. Id. at 149–50. 
 10. Id. at 152–63. 
 11. 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
 12. Id. at 757, 764–75. 
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the case involved an injunction rather than a generally applicable ordinance.13  
In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the Court chose to apply the legal test it 
did because it disapproved of the actions of the protestors in light of the 
strength it attributed to a woman’s interest in procuring an abortion.14  Quoting 
Justice O’Connor, Justice Scalia argued that “no legal rule or doctrine is safe 
from ad hoc nullification by this Court when an occasion for its application 
arises in a case involving state regulation of abortion.”15  In other words, he 
argued, disagreements on the Court over the constitutionality of abortion 
regulations prevented the Court “from evenhandedly applying uncontroversial 
legal doctrines” to abortion-related cases.16 
This Essay will assess how, post-Roe, the Court might resolve 
constitutional questions of federal-state authority over abortion-related matters 
according to abortion-dependent or non-abortion-dependent standards.17  The 
constitutional questions I address include those that Professor Fallon has 
identified in his Article,18 as well some I independently identify here.  
Analyzing whether the Court would resolve these questions according to 
abortion-dependent or non-abortion-dependent standards helps bring into focus 
how the constitutional landscape might appear were the Court to overturn Roe 
v. Wade.  It also permits some preliminary observations concerning the nature 
of the role the Court has carved out for itself in evaluating questions of state 
authority in contrast to questions of federal authority. 
The Essay proceeds as follows.  Part I examines questions of state power 
to regulate abortion in a post-Roe world.  It explains that the Court (or 
individual Justices) seemingly would analyze important questions of state 
power to regulate abortion according to abortion-dependent standards.  Part II 
examines questions of federal power to regulate abortion in a post-Roe world.  
 
 13. Id. at 765. 
 14. Id. at 785 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 15. Id. (quoting Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 
814 (1986) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)). 
 16. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 785 (quoting Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 814 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting)). 
 17. Of course, it is not necessarily the case that the Court as a whole would analyze any 
particular post-Roe constitutional question relating to abortion according to an agreed-upon 
standard.  For some issues, certain Justices might analyze it according to an abortion-dependent 
standard and others according to a non-abortion-dependent standard.  How a Justice selects a 
standard, however, may depend not on a normative commitment to the relative interests that the 
practice of abortion implicates, but on a normative commitment to the way in which courts more 
generally should resolve constitutional questions of the relative power of the federal and state 
governments. 
 18. This Essay does not take up all questions that Professor Fallon identifies (which include 
the authority of states to retrospectively enforce pre-Roe regulations of abortion and certain First 
Amendment issues, see Fallon, supra note 1, at 616, 640), but only those concerning the powers 
of state and federal governments to directly regulate abortion. 
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The federal government might regulate abortion directly, as Professor Fallon 
suggests.  Alternatively, if states attempted to regulate abortion beyond their 
borders, Congress might respond not by prohibiting or allowing abortion, nor 
by simply leaving the matter to the states and courts to sort out, but by 
regulating state authority to regulate abortion.  That is, Congress might 
regulate the authority of the states to regulate abortion extraterritorially.  This 
Part identifies the standards by which the Court (or individual Justices) might 
analyze such questions.  It explains that, in contrast to how the Court 
seemingly would analyze important questions of state power, the Court 
seemingly would analyze questions of federal power according to non-
abortion-dependent standards—that is, standards that do not involve assessing 
the strength of a state’s interest in protecting life or a woman’s interest in 
procuring an abortion. 
Part III draws upon the analyses in Parts I and II to suggest a broader 
perspective on the role that the Court has assumed for itself in evaluating 
questions of state authority in contrast to questions of federal authority.  In 
analyzing questions implicated here of state power to regulate given 
transactions, the Court has embraced discretionary standards entailing a 
judicial assessment of state interests in regulating a given subject-matter in a 
given way.  In analyzing questions of federal power relative to states, in 
contrast, the Court has employed standards that implicate interests 
transcending government interests in particular regulatory outcomes.  Thus, 
regarding questions of state authority to regulate abortion, the judicial analysis 
might turn on the strength of a state’s interest in protecting unborn life.  
Regarding questions of federal authority to regulate abortion or regulate how 
states regulate abortion, judicial analysis might turn on commitments to 
principles of federalism.  Whether, post-Roe, then, the Court would remain 
involved in assessing the strength of state and individual interests in the 
practice of abortion may well depend on what kind of federal or state 
regulation emerged in a post-Roe world. 
I.  STATE POWER TO REGULATE ABORTION 
Professor Fallon identifies several questions regarding state power to 
regulate abortion that could arise if the Court were to overturn Roe.  These 
include questions of whether a state law prohibiting citizens from obtaining 
abortions in other states would violate the Full Faith and Credit or Due Process 
Clauses, the “negative” implications of the Commerce Clause, or the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of Article IV.  As this Part explains, the Due Process, 
Full Faith and Credit, and Dormant Commerce Clause questions implicate 
competing standards, abortion-dependent and non-abortion-dependent, from 
which the Justices would have to choose.  The Privileges and Immunities 
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Clause question implicates non-abortion-dependent standards that appear, 
however, to be particularly susceptible to abortion-dependent refashioning.19 
A. Full Faith and Credit, Due Process, and the “Negative” Commerce 
Clauses: Competing Standards 
There are at least two questions that, should they arise in a post-Roe world, 
would require the Court to choose between competing standards, abortion-
dependent and non-abortion-dependent.  Both questions could arise if a state 
attempted to regulate abortions sought or procured in another state.  To borrow 
Professor Fallon’s hypothetical, suppose that State A prohibited its citizens 
from procuring an abortion in another state, or prohibited an out-of-state doctor 
from performing an abortion on a citizen of State A.20  Such prohibitions could 
implicate two constitutional questions: (1) What authority does a state have to 
regulate abortions procured out of state in light of the Due Process and Full 
Faith and Credit Clauses?  (2) What authority does a state have to regulate 
abortions procured out of state in light of the Commerce Clause? 
1. Full Faith and Credit and Due Process 
There does not appear to be Supreme Court precedent resolving what 
authority states have to regulate out-of-state abortions in light of the Due 
Process21 and Full Faith and Credit Clauses.22  This question is essentially a 
conflict-of-laws one: What authority does a state have under the Constitution 
to apply its own laws in a case arising out of a particular transaction against a 
 
 19. Of course, there is one issue Professor Fallon identifies that could arise relative to state 
or federal regulation that surely would implicate an abortion-dependent standard: whether a state 
could constitutionally prohibit abortions necessary to save the life of the mother.  See Fallon, 
supra note 1, at 625–26.  To resolve this question, as Professor Fallon explains, the Court 
unavoidably would have to engage in balancing of a pregnant woman’s interest in her life and 
state interests in unborn life, a kind of balancing that is the hallmark of the Roe and Casey 
analyses.  Id. at 626. 
 20. See id. at 628. 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1  (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State . . . .”).  As Professor Fallon 
explains, in Bigelow v. Virginia, the Supreme Court reversed a Virginia court’s conviction of the 
editor of a Virginia newspaper for printing an advertisement for an abortion service in New York.  
421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975).  The Court wrote in that case that 
[t]he Virginia legislature could not have regulated the advertiser’s activity in New York, 
and obviously could not have prescribed the activity in that State.  Neither could Virginia 
prevent its residents from traveling to New York to obtain those services, or, as the state 
conceded, prosecute them for going there. 
Id. at 822–24 (citations omitted).  As Professor Fallon rightly observes, even if this language were 
not deemed dictum, “the categorical claim that states may never enact or enforce extraterritorial 
criminal legislation seems too strong.”  Fallon, supra note 1, at 629. 
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competing claim that the laws of another state should apply?  The Court has 
taken two approaches to such questions.  One is a balancing approach.  Under 
the balancing approach, the question is whether State A had “a significant 
contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that 
choice of its law [would be] neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”23  To 
assess whether a state had sufficient “interests” in regulating out-of-state 
abortions, the Court presumably would have to assess a state’s interests in 
protecting unborn life conceived in one of its citizens relative to the interests of 
that citizen in availing herself of the abortion benefits of the laws of another 
state.24  In making such an assessment, the Court would be balancing the 
interests of states seeking to protect unborn life and women seeking abortions 
that the Court balanced in Roe and Casey.  Accordingly, were the Court to 
address the question whether a State constitutionally may prohibit it citizens 
from seeking out-of-state abortions according to an “interest analysis,” it likely 
would be choosing a standard that, in application, would be abortion-
dependent. 
It is not certain, however, that the Court would resolve the question of state 
constitutional authority under the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit 
Clauses to regulate out-of-state abortions according to an “interest analysis.”  
The Court (or individual Justices) might invoke a more categorical rule based 
on historical practice.  In Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,25 the Court had to resolve 
whether a forum state could apply its own statute of limitations to claims that 
in substance the law of another state must govern.26  Rather than engage in an 
interest analysis, the Court held that under “long established and still subsisting 
choice-of-law practices,” statutes of limitation are procedural and thus within 
the legislative competence of a forum state to apply as governing law in cases 
brought within its jurisdiction.27  Accordingly, the Court concluded, under the 
Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses, a state categorically may apply 
its own statute of limitations in cases brought before its own courts. 
If long established choice-of-law practices can operate to define the 
legislative competence of a state, there is an argument to be made that a state 
generally has legislative competence to regulate the activities of its citizens, in-
state or out-of-state—in some circumstances by criminal sanction.  Certain 
early nineteenth century accounts of the law of nations recognized a sovereign 
prerogative in states to regulate their citizens no matter where they were.  As 
Joseph Story explained in his famous treatise on the conflict of laws: 
 
 23. Phillips Petrol. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 
449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981) (plurality opinion)). 
 24. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 629–30. 
 25. 486 U.S. 717 (1988). 
 26. Id. at 719. 
 27. Id. at 722–30. 
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[N]ations generally assert a claim to regulate the rights, duties, obligations, and 
acts of their own citizens, wherever they may be domiciled.  And, so far as 
these rights, duties, obligations, and acts afterwards come under the 
cognizance of the tribunals of the sovereign power of their own country, either 
for enforcement, or for protection, or for remedy, there may be no just ground 
to exclude this claim.28 
Thus, according to Story, “every nation has a right to bind its own subjects by 
its own laws in every other place.”29 
Some nineteenth century courts suggested that this principle applied to 
certain criminal regulations.  In 1819, in Commonwealth v. Gaines,30 the 
General Court of Virginia explained that “the Law of Nations recognizes the 
right of a State to punish its own citizens for the commission of crimes either 
of lesae majestatis, or of other dangerous and injurious tendencies, out of its 
own territorial limits.”31  Moreover, the court explained, in England “it is not 
thought absurd, nor has it been unusual to enact Statutes by which their 
subjects are punished for offences committed out of the Realm.”32  In 1863, in 
Chandler v. Main,33 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin explained that “it seems 
to be well established, that every nation has the right to punish its own citizens 
for the violation of its laws, wherever committed.”34 
Other writers suggested that a state only had jurisdiction to punish citizens 
for acts committed abroad when the offense was particularly injurious to the 
state.  In People v. Tyler,35 Judge Isaac Christiancy of the Supreme Court of 
Michigan explained that “every sovereignty has the right, subject to certain 
restrictions, to protect itself from, and to punish as crimes, certain acts which 
are particularly injurious to its rights or interests, or those of its citizens, 
wherever committed.”36  Thus, he explained: 
without attempting to enumerate all, the citizen may commit treason by acts or 
combinations abroad; the commerce of a nation may be injured, or its pacific 
relations with other governments endangered, by the criminal conduct of the 
 
 28. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, 
IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO 
MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS 451 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & 
Co. 1834). 
 29. Id. at 22. 
 30. 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 172 (1819). 
 31. Id. at 176. 
 32. Id. 
 33. 16 Wis. 398 (1863). 
 34. Id. at 419. 
 35. 7 Mich. 161 (1859). 
 36. Id. at 221 (Christiancy, J., concurring). 
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crews or passengers of its ships in foreign ports.  In such cases the offender 
may be punished by the government of which he is a citizen . . . .37 
In his famous treatise on the conflict of laws, Francis Wharton asserted that a 
state may apply its criminal laws to certain offenses committed by its citizens 
extraterritorially—offenses committed on the high seas, political offenses, 
forgery, and homicides.38  In 1941, in Skiriotes v. Florida,39 the Supreme Court 
upheld state authority to criminally regulate the conduct of a citizen 
extraterritorially under one of these categories—offenses committed on the 
high seas.40  In Skiriotes, the Court explained that “a criminal statute dealing 
with acts that are directly injurious to the government, and are capable of 
perpetration without regard to particular locality is to be construed as 
applicable to citizens of the United States upon the high seas or in a foreign 
country.”41  Likewise, the Court explained, “[i]f the United States may control 
the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas, we see no reason why the State 
of Florida may not likewise govern the conduct of its citizens upon the high 
seas with respect to matters in which the State has a legitimate interest.”42  
Citing Skiriotes, a Comment in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 
explains that “[a]n individual State of the United States . . . has jurisdiction to 
apply its local law in certain instances to its absent citizens.”43 
If the Court were to identify a historical practice recognizing state 
authority to apply criminal laws extraterritorially to citizens, it could hold that 
a state may prohibit its citizens from seeking abortions in other states without 
assessing the strength of the state’s interest in the prohibition.  This holding 
would reflect a non-abortion-dependent principle—that a state may apply its 
criminal laws extraterritorially.  If, rather, the Court were to identify only a 
narrower historical understanding—that states may apply criminal laws 
extraterritorially to citizens only when they have a demonstrable “legitimate 
interest” in doing so or when the regulated conduct is “particularly injurious” 
to the state—the Court might have to assess the strength of the state’s interest 
(historically understood or absolutely) in prohibiting its citizens from seeking 
 
 37. Id. at 221–22. 
 38. FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS OR PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, INCLUDING A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF ANGLO-AMERICAN, ROMAN, 
GERMAN, AND FRENCH JURISPRUDENCE §§ 858–75 (Phil., Kay & Brother 1872). 
 39. 313 U.S. 69 (1941). 
 40. Id. at 77. 
 41. Id. at 73–74. 
 42. Id. at 77 (emphasis added). 
 43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 9, cmt. F (1971) (emphasis added).  
In light of the history of this precedent, it has been argued that Bigelow is the only Supreme Court 
“decision calling into question the extraterritorial authority of states over citizens.”  Mark P. 
Gergen, Equality and the Conflict of Laws, 73 IOWA L. REV. 893, 907 n.94 (1988) (citing Bigelow 
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)). 
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abortions in other states.  This assessment could constitute an abortion-
dependent inquiry into the sufficiency of a state’s interest in prohibiting its 
citizens from obtaining abortions in other states. 
2. Dormant Commerce Clause 
A second question regarding a state’s power to regulate activities that 
occur extraterritorially is whether the Commerce Clause44 imposes any 
limitations upon its ability to do so.  The Court has held that the Commerce 
Clause not only authorizes congressional regulation of commerce, but also, by 
“negative” implication, precludes certain forms of state regulation affecting 
commerce.  There are two strands to the Court’s so-called “negative” 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  First, the Court has held that the Commerce 
Clause prohibits “state regulations that unjustifiably discriminate on their face 
against out-of-state entities.”45  Moreover, the Court has held that the 
Commerce Clause may, under a balancing test, preclude state regulations that 
do not discriminate facially against out-of-state entities.  In Pike v. Bruce 
Church,46 the Court explained that if a state law “regulates even-handedly to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate 
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on 
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”47  
“[T]he extent of the burden that will be tolerated,” the Court explained, will 
“depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be 
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”48 
A state law prohibiting citizens from procuring abortions in state or out of 
state would not seem to discriminate against out-of-state citizens.  
Accordingly, the issue for the Court would be whether a state law prohibiting a 
citizen from procuring an out-of-state abortion imposed an excessive burden 
on commerce relative to the state’s interest in the regulation.  In applying this 
test to a state law prohibiting citizens from procuring out-of-state abortions, the 
Court would have to assess the “legitimacy” and “nature” of a state’s interest 
in protecting unborn life relative to the burden that the prohibition would 
impose on interstate commerce.  Professor Fallon observes that, in applying 
this test, a court would have to assess a state’s interest in protecting unborn life 
in apparently the same way it has assessed it under the frameworks of Roe and 
Casey.49  Rather than assess whether the burden a state imposed on an 
 
 44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”). 
 45. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Com’n, 545 U.S. 429, 433 (2005) (citing 
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)). 
 46. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
 47. Id. at 142. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Fallon, supra note 1, at 637. 
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individual’s interest in an abortion was “undue,” as courts do under Casey,50 
the Court would assess whether the burden on commerce was “undue.”  The 
analysis would be abortion-dependent insofar as the Court would have to 
assess whether the “burden” on commerce was justified relative to a state’s 
interest in protecting unborn life. 
It is worth noting that two Justices have categorically rejected this 
balancing test as a means of giving effect to the Commerce Clause.  Justices 
Scalia and Thomas have argued that “[t]he historical record provides no 
grounds for reading the Commerce Clause to be other than what it says—an 
authorization for Congress to regulate commerce.”51  In other words, they 
believe that the Commerce Clause does not operate to negative state laws of its 
own force.  On grounds of stare decisis, they would “enforce a self-executing 
‘negative’ Commerce Clause . . . against a state law that facially discriminates 
against interstate commerce”;52 they would not, however, invoke the Pike 
balancing test in situations to which the Court has yet to apply it.  Under their 
view, a state categorically would not violate the Commerce Clause by 
prohibiting its citizens from procuring out-of-state abortions.  There would be 
no need for the Court to assess a state’s interest in protecting unborn life to 
uphold the regulation.  Thus, they would analyze the “negative” Commerce 
Clause issue according to a non-abortion-dependent standard, whereas other 
Justices seemingly would analyze it according to an abortion-dependent 
standard. 
B. Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV: Non-Abortion-Dependent 
Standards Susceptible to Abortion-Dependent Refashioning 
The preceding section deemed certain standards abortion-dependent 
because, in applying them to determine state authority to regulate abortion 
extraterritorially, the Court would have to assess the strength of a state’s 
interest in protecting unborn life.  It deemed other standards non-abortion-
dependent because, in applying them to determine state authority to regulate 
abortion, the Court would strain credulity to self-consciously assess a state’s 
interest in unborn life or a woman’s interest in an abortion: these standards by 
their terms serve interests not specific to the practice of abortion.  That said, 
certain issues of state power to regulate abortion that could arise post-Roe 
 
 50. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (plurality opinion) 
(“Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make this 
decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause.”). 
 51. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 209 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(quoting Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 263 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).  Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s 
concurring opinion. 
 52. Id. at 210. 
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implicate standards that appear by their terms to be non-abortion-dependent 
but that are sufficiently ill-defined as to be particularly susceptible to abortion-
dependent refashioning. 
The question whether the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV53 
prevents a state from prohibiting its citizens from procuring out-of-state 
abortions implicates such a standard.  As Professor Fallon describes, scholars 
have asserted two competing visions of the operation of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause in this context.54  Professor Mark Rosen has argued that the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause precludes a state from imposing 
discriminatory burdens on citizens of other states; it does not prohibit a state 
from regulating the out-of-state activities of its own citizens.55  Under this rule, 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause categorically would not preclude a state 
from prohibiting its citizens from seeking out-of-state abortions.  There would 
be no need for a court, in reaching this conclusion, to balance a citizen’s 
interest in obtaining an abortion against the state’s interest in protecting unborn 
life.  Accordingly, application of the rule would not be abortion-dependent. 
Contrariwise, Professor Seth Kreimer has argued that under the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause, a citizen of State A who visits State B is “‘entitled’ to 
local privileges and immunities” of State B.56  In other words, when a non-
Californian enters California, that person has a “right as a citizen of the United 
States to be treated with the same respect shown to native Californians.”57  On 
its face, this theory of the Privileges and Immunities Clause appears to be non-
abortion-dependent.  If a visiting non-citizen is entitled to all benefits that a 
state affords its citizens, the non-citizen would be entitled to procure an 
abortion not because it is an abortion, but because it is something to which 
citizens are entitled. 
Even if Professor Kreimer’s theory is generally correct, the principle it 
asserts cannot be “absolute.”58  First, the Court has explained that “[o]nly with 
respect to those ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ bearing upon the vitality of the 
Nation as a single entity must the state treat all citizens, resident and 
nonresident, equally.”59  Moreover, the Court has explained that a state may 
have a “substantial reason” for discriminating against citizens of other states, 
 
 53. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the several States.”). 
 54. Fallon, supra note 1, at 633–35. 
 55. Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in American Federalism, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 897–903 (2002). 
 56. Seth F. Kreimer, “But Whoever Treasures Freedom . . .”: The Right to Travel and 
Extraterritorial Abortions, 91 MICH. L. REV. 907, 919 (1993). 
 57. Id. at 917. 
 58. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 (1999) (explaining that the protections of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV are not “absolute”). 
 59. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978). 
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for example, for requiring them to pay more for a hunting license,60 to enroll in 
a state university,61 or to vote or hold elective public office.62  If a court were 
to accept Professor Kreimer’s view but account for these principles, it would 
have to assess whether the benefit of procuring an abortion in State B was the 
kind of benefit to which the Privileges and Immunities Clause entitles a citizen 
of State A when in State B.63  In making this determination, a court might 
normatively assess the value of the benefit of being able to procure an 
abortion, the assessment that lies at the heart of Roe and Casey.  Accordingly, 
Professor Kreimer’s theory of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
IV sets up a standard that appears in formulation to be non-abortion-dependent 
but that in application might prove actually to be abortion-dependent. 
C. Summary 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that there is no question of state 
power to regulate abortion extraterritorially that the Court, without question, 
would resolve under a non-abortion-dependent standard.  To state it 
affirmatively, it is possible, if not likely, that the Court would address most 
questions of state authority to regulate abortion examined here under abortion-
dependent standards.  The Court might resolve state authority under the Full 
Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses to prohibit citizens from obtaining 
out-of-state abortions by assessing the strength of state interests under the 
Allstate interest analysis.  If the Court were to pursue whether, under 
traditional choice-of-law principles, it was understood that states could 
criminally regulate citizens’ out-of-state conduct, it might categorically 
recognize a power to so regulate.  But it might also discover a tradition under 
which courts assessed whether a state had a “legitimate interest” in making 
such a criminal regulation.  Moreover, in a “negative” Commerce Clause 
analysis, the Court likely would assess the nature of a state’s interest in 
regulating abortions occurring beyond its borders.  Finally, certain standards 
that the Court might invoke under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 
though appearing non-abortion-dependent as formulated, could prove abortion-
dependent in application. 
II.  FEDERAL POWER TO REGULATE ABORTION 
Professor Fallon also identifies questions regarding federal power to 
regulate abortion that could arise if the Court were to overturn Roe.  
Specifically, he identifies questions that would arise were Congress to directly 
 
 60. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502 (citing Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 390–91). 
 61. Id. (citing Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 445 (1973)). 
 62. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383. 
 63. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
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prohibit or protect the practice of abortion.64  In addition to the issues that 
Professor Fallon identifies, it is worth considering others.  In controversial 
areas such as gay marriage and tort reform, certain federal initiatives have 
taken the form not of direct regulation of individuals, but of regulation of state 
authority to regulate individuals.  If states were to regulate abortion 
extraterritorially, Congress might respond by defining what aspects of abortion 
a state may permissibly regulate.  Were Congress to prohibit or permit 
extraterritorial state regulation of abortion, a host of constitutional questions 
would arise regarding congressional power to do so. 
As this Part explains, the Court likely would invoke non-abortion-
dependent standards to resolve most questions of federal power to regulate the 
practice (or to regulate states’ regulation of the practice) of abortion. 
A. Federal Regulation of the Practice of Abortion: A Non-Abortion-
Dependent Standard 
Professor Fallon argues that under the Commerce Clause congressional 
power to regulate abortions seems plain: “Abortions are services sold in 
interstate commerce, and the business of providing medical care, including 
abortions, is intertwined with commerce in innumerable ways.”65  In Gonzales 
v. Raich,66 the Supreme Court explained that its “case law firmly establishes 
Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic 
‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”67  
Even abortions performed on a non-commercial basis would seem, as 
Professor Fallon explains, to be part of a class of activities—abortions 
generally—for which there is an interstate market.68 
It has been argued that the Court’s Commerce Clause standards are 
sufficiently malleable that judges may apply them to reach politically desired 
results.69  Regardless of whether this is true, the “substantial effects” test, by its 
terms, is non-abortion-dependent.  The test concerns the relation of an activity 
to “commerce,” not the interest of a state in regulating an activity relative to 
the interests of an individual to be free from such regulation.  As Professor 
 
 64. Fallon, supra note 1, at 621–25. 
 65. Id. at 622–23. 
 66. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 67. Id. at 17. 
 68. Fallon, supra note 1, at 623; cf. Robert J. Pushaw, Does Congress Have the 
Constitutional Power to Prohibit Partial-Birth Abortion?, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 319 (2005) 
(arguing that the Court should sustain the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act “because the 
performance of partial-birth abortions is ‘commerce’—the sale of a service in the market—that 
has demonstrable effects ‘among the states’”). 
 69. See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 68, at 319 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s current Commerce 
Clause standards . . . are malleable and therefore tend to be applied in light of each judge’s 
politics and ideology.”). 
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Fallon observes, a judge who was not prepared to accept the results of applying 
the substantial effects test in the context of abortion because the context was 
abortion (and who was committed to making an honest account of his or her 
reasons for action) would have “to redefine and limit Congress’s commerce 
power” itself,70 or rely on another constitutional provision as limiting 
congressional power.71 
It is not clear, however, whether, if Roe were overturned, any of the 
Justices would be inclined to refashion the commerce power based on 
normative commitments regarding abortion.  In Raich, for instance, certain 
Justices expressly subjugated normative commitments to policies underlying 
the regulations at issue to commitments regarding the federal-state balance of 
power.  Justice Stevens, writing for a majority, described a federal prohibition 
on the use of homegrown marijuana for medicinal purposes as “troubling.”72  
Nonetheless, based on a normative commitment to the degree of federal power 
he understands Congress to have under the Constitution, Justice Stevens wrote 
for the Court to uphold the federal prohibition.73  In dissent, Justice O’Connor 
made clear that she did not find a prohibition on the use of marijuana for 
medical purposes troubling: “If I were a California citizen, I would not have 
voted for the medical marijuana ballot initiative; if I were a California 
legislator I would not have supported the Compassionate Use Act.”74  
Nonetheless, she voted to hold the federal prohibition on the use of intrastate 
marijuana for medicinal purposes unconstitutional.75  Rather than effectuate a 
commitment in favor of the substance of the federal regulation, she would have 
effectuated a commitment to limitations on federal authority to regulate.  In 
particular, she described a normative commitment to “[o]ne of federalism’s 
chief virtues”—“that it promotes innovation by allowing for the possibility that 
‘a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and 
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.’”76  Accordingly, she resolved that “whatever the wisdom of 
California’s experiment with medical marijuana, the federalism principles that 
have driven our Commerce Clause cases require that room for experiment be 
protected in this case.”77 
 
 70. Fallon, supra note 1, at 624. 
 71. Id. 
 72. 545 U.S. at 9. 
 73. See id. (“The CSA is a valid exercise of federal power, even as applied to the troubling 
facts of this case.”). 
 74. Id. at 57 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 42 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting)). 
 77. Raich, 545 U.S. at 57 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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The point of this is simply that the standard by which the Court would 
resolve whether Congress has commerce power to regulate the practice of 
abortion would seemingly be a non-abortion-dependent one.  The “substantial 
effects” test in terms does not lend itself to weighing a state’s interest in 
protecting unborn life against a woman’s interest in procuring an abortion.  It 
is not entirely clear, either, that a Justice otherwise disposed to refashion a 
legal test to fit a desired result relating to the practice of abortion would in fact 
so refashion the commerce power; there are potentially competing normative 
commitments to federalism that might predominate. 
B. Federal Regulation of States’ Regulation of Abortion: Non-Abortion-
Dependent Standards, Generally 
It is conceivable that if Congress chose in a post-Roe world to regulate 
abortion, it would not regulate abortion directly, but rather would regulate the 
states’ authority to regulate abortion.  Since Professor Fallon does not address 
the possibility of such measures, I will analyze them here in more detail than I 
have analyzed other measures. 
In two famous situations of perceived “overregulation” by states, Congress 
has responded (or been urged to respond) not by preempting state regulation 
with a federal standard but by defining the limits of state authority.  The first is 
gay marriage.  When Hawaii became the first state to recognize gay marriage, 
the question arose whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause78 would require 
other states to recognize all gay marriages that Hawaii recognized.  To the 
extent that the issue called for a national resolution, Congress did not provide 
that gay marriage shall or shall not be a national institution.  Rather, Congress 
provided in the Defense of Marriage Act that one state need not recognize a 
gay marriage that is recognized under the laws of another state.79  In effect, 
Congress provided that a state has no authority to act in such a way as to 
legally require another state to recognize a marriage between persons of the 
same sex. 
A second situation of perceived “overregulation” by the states is state court 
jurisdiction in tort law cases.  State courts have broad-based jurisdiction over 
out-of-state business entities that have certain “minimum contacts” with the 
jurisdiction.  A perceived problem is that in certain instances plaintiffs forum-
 
 78. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other state . . . .”). 
 79. Specifically, the Act provides: 
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to 
give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, 
possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is 
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a 
right or claim arising from such relationship. 
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). 
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shop for jurisdictions that have “plaintiff friendly” laws or juries.  Opponents 
of such forum-shopping and large recoveries in tort cases advocate “tort 
reform.”  Tort reform could entail Congress enacting uniform national 
standards governing liability in personal injury, products liability, and medical 
malpractice cases.  Proposals for tort reform tend more, however, toward 
limiting the jurisdiction of state courts in tort cases or providing procedures by 
which state courts must adjudicate tort cases.  For example, the Product 
Liability Reform Act of 1998 would have regulated statutes of limitations and 
repose in certain categories of state court litigation.80  The Lawsuit Abuse 
Reduction Act of 2004,81 which passed the House of Representatives in 2004 
and was reintroduced the following year,82 would have limited the jurisdiction 
that state courts may exercise in personal injury cases.  Specifically, it would 
have required a tightened connection between, on the one hand, a state and, on 
the other, the parties or the transaction underlying the plaintiff’s claim, for a 
state court to exercise jurisdiction in personal injury cases.83  In effect, these 
measures would not provide a federal standard governing tort actions; rather, 
they would limit a state’s authority to adjudicate tort cases. 
If states were to regulate abortion extraterritorially post-Roe, and the 
conflict-of-laws issues this created were thought to warrant a national solution, 
Congress might attempt to define the regulatory authority of states over 
abortion rather than regulate abortion itself.  Congress could do this in two 
ways: it could provide (1) a choice-of-law rule or (2) a choice-of-forum rule.  
Were Congress to provide either kind of rule, constitutional questions of 
congressional power would arise, implicating competing standards among 
which the Justices would have to choose. 
1. Choice-of-Law Regulation 
Through a choice-of-law provision, Congress could favor the laws of a 
state in the territory of which an abortion occurred, or the laws of a state of 
which a person procuring an abortion was a citizen.  To favor territorial 
regulation, Congress could provide: “In any civil or criminal action arising 
from or relating to an abortion, the laws of the State in which the abortion 
occurs shall provide the rule of decision unless the Constitution, laws or 
treaties of the United States shall otherwise require or provide.”  To favor 
regulation of citizens, Congress could substitute “of which the person seeking 
the abortion is a citizen” for “in which the abortion occurs.”  If Congress had 
power to enact such regulations, its power would likely derive from the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV: “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in 
 
 80. S. 2236, 105th Cong. §§ 106, 107 (1998). 
 81. H.R. 4571, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 82. H.R. 420, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 83. Id. § 4(a). 
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each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other 
State; And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which 
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”84  
Congressional power would derive from the highlighted portion, namely the 
Effects Clause. 
A congressional statute mandating that either the law of the state in which 
an abortion occurred or the law of the state of which the person procuring an 
abortion was a citizen shall govern would restrict states from exercising 
powers that states traditionally have exercised.  As explained, states 
traditionally have been understood to have authority to regulate the activities of 
citizens, even to regulate certain activities that occur extraterritorially.85  And 
there is unquestionably an established tradition of state constitutional authority 
to regulate activities occurring within the territory of the state.86 
The relationship between state power to regulate matters that states 
traditionally have regulated and congressional power to limit that power under 
the Effects Clause is unsettled.  In Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,87 the Court held 
that a state had constitutional power to apply its own statute of limitations to 
claims that in substance the laws of another state had to govern.88  The Court 
premised this holding on “long established and still subsisting choice-of-law 
practices.”89  That those practices may “come to be thought . . . unwise,” the 
Court explained, does not mean that they “thereby become unconstitutional.”90  
The Court proceeded to observe that if it becomes “desirable that forum States 
no longer treat a particular issue as procedural for conflict of laws purposes, 
those States can themselves adopt a rule to that effect,” or “it can be proposed 
that Congress legislate to that effect under the second sentence of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause.”91  It is revealing that here the Court confidently declared 
that States can adopt a rule that they will apply the statutes of limitations of 
other states, but less confidently declared that “it can be proposed” that 
Congress require states to apply other states’ statutes of limitations.  The Court 
may have been reluctant to declare simply that “Congress may legislate to that 
 
 84. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 85. See supra notes 28–43 and accompanying text. 
 86. See generally STORY, supra note 28, at 19 (The first and most general maxim or 
proposition [of International Jurisprudence] is that . . . every nation possesses an exclusive 
sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory.”). 
 87. 486 U.S. 717 (1988). 
 88. Id. at 729 
 89. Id. at 728; see id. at 726 (explaining that “[t]he historical record shows conclusively, we 
think, that the society which adopted the Constitution did not regard statutes of limitations as 
substantive provisions, akin to the rules governing the validity and effect of contracts, but rather 
as procedural restrictions fashioned by each jurisdiction for its own courts”). 
 90. Id. at 728–29. 
 91. Id. at 729 (emphasis added). 
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effect” because the Court has never settled any substantial definition of 
congressional power under the Effects Clause.92 
Scholars have offered various theories of what power Congress has to 
require a state to enforce the laws of another rather than its own under the 
Effects Clause.  These theories are generally non-abortion-dependent insofar as 
each would define congressional power under the Effects Clause relative to 
abortion regulation without performing a Roe-type consideration of competing 
interests. 
Professor Mark Rosen has usefully divided these theories into two 
categories.  The first category includes “Congressional Supremacy” theories.93  
“Proponents of this approach view Congress’s plenary power as encompassing 
both expansion and contraction of effect that a forum must give to another 
state’s acts or judgments.”94  Under this theory, Congress’s authority to 
prescribe a choice-of-law rule for the States is plenary and thus, in a post-Roe 
world, would not depend on balancing interests relative to the practice of 
abortion.  The second category includes “Interstitial Power” theories.95  Under 
these theories, “Congress has power to legislate only with respect to matters 
about which the Supreme Court has not provided a full faith and credit rule.”96  
There are two variations of these theories: (1) that Congress may enforce the 
self-executing requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause where judicial 
enforcement is insufficient; or (2) that Congress may require one state to give 
more respect to the acts and judgments of another state than the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause requires, but not less.97  Under neither variation would the Court 
have to engage in a balancing of state and individual interests relative to 
abortion to determine the scope of congressional power.  Once the Court 
identified the baseline of what the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires (an 
exercise that could be abortion-dependent under an interest analysis, as 
explained in the last Part),98 the question for the Court would be (1) whether 
Congress was enforcing those requirements, no more and no less, or (2) 
 
 92. Congress has enacted legislation under the Effects Clause only five times, and the 
Supreme Court has never considered a constitutional challenge on Effects Clause grounds.  Mark 
D. Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Not (Yet?) Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith 
and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors That Determine What the Constitution Requires, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 915, 965 & n.187 (2006) (explaining that Congress has legislated under the 
Effects Clause only five times, describing those enactments, and observing that the enactments 
have not been challenged in the Supreme Court on Effects Clause grounds).  Accordingly, the 
Court has not had occasion to meaningfully expound upon congressional power under the Effects 
Clause. 
 93. Id. at 958. 
 94. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 95. Id. at 959. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Rosen, supra note 92, at 959. 
 98. See supra notes 23–43 and accompanying text. 
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whether Congress was requiring a state to give more faith and credit, but not 
less. 
Professor Rosen himself has offered a two-step approach to questions of 
congressional power under the Effects Clause.  Under his approach, courts first 
should apply a “clear statement rule” to ensure that Congress has considered 
interests of state autonomy and national unity “in the context in which the 
statute is being applied.”99  Second, Professor Rosen argues that courts should 
assess whether the rule Congress has enacted under the Effects Clause “is 
reasonable, taking into account the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s twin goals of 
creating a union and meaningfully empowering states.”100  Insofar as he 
describes this inquiry as “intrinsically open ended,”101 it is possible that, under 
the standard he proposes, a state’s interest in regulating abortion and a 
woman’s interest in procuring an abortion could figure in the analysis.  With 
this exception, however, scholars have framed most theories of congressional 
power under the Effects Clause in terms that would not lend themselves in 
application to express consideration of the competing interests that underlie the 
Court’s analyses in Roe and Casey. 
2. Choice-of-Forum Regulation 
Another way for Congress to regulate the states’ regulation of abortion 
would be to enact a choice-of-forum provision.  Through a choice-of-forum 
provision, Congress could control the law governing certain abortion disputes.  
If, for example, State A were to criminally prohibit its citizens from procuring 
abortions within or without State A, and State B were to allow any person 
present in State B to legally procure an abortion, Congress could resolve this 
conflict of laws by prescribing the forum in which criminal prosecutions 
relating to abortion must be brought.  If Congress wanted to favor the 
territorial interests of a state, it might provide: “Any action against a person for 
procuring or providing an abortion may be brought only in the courts of the 
State in which the alleged abortion giving rise to the action was procured or 
provided.”  By requiring the action to be brought in the state in which the 
abortion was performed, the Court would exclude the courts of another state 
from trying to enforce a contrary regulation.  If Congress wanted to favor the 
interests of a state in regulating its citizens, it might provide: “Any action 
against a person for procuring or providing an abortion may be brought only in 
the courts of the State of which the person procuring the abortion giving rise to 
the action is a citizen.”  By requiring the action to be brought in the state of 
which the person procuring an abortion was a citizen, the Court would exclude 
the courts of another state from trying to enforce a contrary regulation. 
 
 99. Rosen, supra note 92, at 977. 
 100. Id. at 978. 
 101. Id. 
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If Congress constitutionally may enact such regulation, the source of its 
power likely would be the Commerce Clause.102  The Lawsuit Abuse 
Reduction Act of 2005 (LARA), for example—a measure designed to regulate 
the jurisdiction of state courts over tort claims—was introduced in Congress as 
a regulation of interstate commerce.103  If Congress enacted a statute regulating 
state court jurisdiction over state law actions, the statute would generate 
difficult questions of congressional power. 
The first set of questions would relate to whether a federal regulation of 
state court jurisdiction would be a regulation of “commerce” under the 
Commerce Clause.  The Supreme Court explained in Gonzales v. Raich104 that 
its “case law firmly establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely local 
activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.”105  One question that would arise 
under this test is whether a federal law regulating state court jurisdiction 
qualifies as a regulation of “economic” or “commercial” activity.106  In United 
States v. Morrison,107 the Court held that Congress exceeded its powers under 
the Commerce Clause when it enacted the Violence Against Women Act of 
1994 in part because “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any 
sense of the phrase, economic activity.”108  The Court maintained this element 
of the Commerce Clause inquiry in Raich, finding that the class of regulated 
activities under the Controlled Substances Act, unlike gender-motivated 
violence, was “quintessentially economic.”109 
Accordingly, were Congress to regulate the state fora in which abortion 
cases could be brought, the Court would have to resolve what constituted the 
regulated activity and whether it was itself “economic,” or part of a larger class 
 
 102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”). 
 103. The House Report on the Act explained: 
Congress unquestionably has the authority to regulate economic activities that “affect” 
interstate commerce, and forum shopping clearly has a substantial affect on interstate 
commerce by allowing opportunities for personal injury lawyers to exploit lax venue and 
forum non conveniens rules to pick and choose those courts with a reputation for 
consistently awarding near-limitless awards.  Section 4 of the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction 
Act clearly applies to economic activities, as the definition of “personal injury claim” is a 
claim “to recover” for a person’s personal injury.  Such a provision is entirely consistent 
with federalism principles. 
H.R. REP. NO. 109–123, at 35 (2005). 
 104. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 105. Id. at 17. 
 106. See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 
YALE L.J. 947 (2001) (analyzing this question). 
 107. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 108. Id. at 613. 
 109. Raich, 545 U.S. at 25. 
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of “economic” activities that the statute regulated.  The House Report on 
LARA deemed the regulated activity to be not the jurisdiction of state courts 
but the “recovery” that a personal injury claim allows—an economic 
activity.110  Assuming that this was a permissible characterization of the 
regulated activity in the tort context,  it is not clear that Congress could 
likewise deem the “liability” a criminal law imposes an “economic” activity.  
The question, in any event, whether a federal choice-of-forum law in abortion 
cases regulated an “economic” activity would not be abortion-dependent in 
concept: to answer it, courts would analyze whether criminal liability for an 
abortion-related activity was an economic activity, not balance a state’s interest 
in protecting unborn life against an individual’s interest in terminating a 
pregnancy. 
Even if the Court determined that a federal choice-of-forum clause 
qualified as a regulation of “economic” activity, it might have to address 
whether such a regulation was “proper” in light of principles of state 
sovereignty that the Court has recognized.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
suggested that there are limits on Congress’s power to regulate the jurisdiction 
of state courts.  In 1912, in Mondou v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford 
Railroad Co.,111 the Court held that state courts must enforce actions arising 
under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA),112 but specifically noted 
that Congress had not attempted in FELA “to enlarge or regulate the 
jurisdiction of state courts.”113  In 1947, in Testa v. Katt,114 the Court held that 
a state court must enforce a federal action if it has “jurisdiction adequate and 
appropriate under established local law to adjudicate [the] action.”115  More 
recently, in 1999 in Alden v. Maine,116 the Court explained that Congress 
generally “may require state courts of adequate and appropriate jurisdiction to 
enforce federal prescriptions.”117  Finally, in 2003, in Jinks v. Richland Co.,118 
the Court expressly reserved the question whether Congress generally has 
power to regulate practice and procedure in state courts in state law cases.119  
Each of these cases at least suggests that there may be a domain of state 
authority over state courts that is off-limits to federal regulation. 
 
 110. See H.R. REP. NO. 109–123, at 35 (2005). 
 111. 223 U.S. 1 (1912). 
 112. Id. at 59. 
 113. Id. at 56; see also Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876) (explaining that federal 
rights of action are enforceable in state court, so long as the state court is “competent to decide 
rights of the like character and class”). 
 114. 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
 115. Id. at 394. 
 116. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 117. Id. at 752 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 118. 538 U.S. 456 (2003). 
 119. Id. at 464–65. 
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It is worth pausing for a moment on Jinks.  In Jinks, the Court addressed 
whether Congress had authority to provide for the tolling of state statutes of 
limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  Section 1367 gives federal district courts 
“supplemental jurisdiction” over certain state law claims.  It tolls the statute of 
limitations on state law claims brought within a district court’s supplemental 
jurisdiction but over which the district court ultimately declines to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction.120  The respondents argued in Jinks that the tolling 
provision was “not a ‘proper’ exercise of Congress’s Article I powers [to 
regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts] because it violates principles of 
state sovereignty” insofar as Congress lacks authority to regulate state court 
“procedure” in state law cases.121  (In Printz v. United States,122 the Court had 
explained that, under the Necessary and Proper Clause,123 “[w]hen a [l]aw for 
carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause violates the principle of state 
sovereignty reflected in . . . various constitutional provisions . . . , it is not a 
[l]aw proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause.”124)  In Jinks, 
the Court rejected the argument that the tolling provision was not a “proper” 
regulation on the ground that a statute of limitations was “substantive,” not 
“procedural,” to the extent the distinction is meaningful in this context.125 
The Jinks analysis helps frame constitutional questions of state sovereignty 
that the Court could face if Congress were to regulate the jurisdiction of state 
courts in abortion cases.  In determining whether a regulation of commerce is 
“proper” in light of principles of state sovereignty, the Court has employed 
three paradigms in recent years: (1) non-interference with “traditional state 
functions,” (2) anti-commandeering, and (3) non-interference with incidents of 
state sovereignty evidenced by principles of English law or the law of nations.  
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,126 the Court rejected 
the “traditional governmental functions” paradigm as an independent limit on 
federal authority;127 accordingly, only the last two paradigms warrant 
examination here. 
In New York v. United States, the Court held that Congress may not 
“commandeer” a state legislature to enact a federal regulatory program.128  In 
Printz v. United States, the Court held that Congress may not “commandeer” 
 
 120. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2000). 
 121. Jinks, 538 U.S. at 464. 
 122. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers . . . .”). 
 124. Printz, 521 U.S. at 923–24 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 125. Jinks, 538 U.S. at 464–65. 
 126. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 127. Id. at 530–31 (overruling Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). 
 128. 505 U.S. 144, 202 (1992). 
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state executive officials to enforce a federal regulatory program.129  In both 
cases, the Court was careful to explain that Congress does not 
unconstitutionally commandeer state courts when it requires them to enforce 
federal law.  In New York, the Court explained that “[f]ederal statutes 
enforceable in state courts do, in a sense, direct state judges to enforce them, 
but this sort of federal ‘direction’ of state judges is mandated by the text of the 
Supremacy Clause.”130  In Printz, the Court explained that the Constitution 
does “permit imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce federal 
prescriptions, insofar as those prescriptions related to matters appropriate for 
the judicial power.”131  Neither New York nor Printz addressed, however, the 
power of Congress to regulate the procedure or jurisdiction of state courts.  In 
Reno v. Condon,132 the Court explained New York and Printz as prohibiting 
Congress from “seek[ing] to control or influence the manner in which States 
regulate private parties” but allowing Congress to regulate individual or “state 
activities.”133  If Congress prescribed the state forum in which an abortion case 
must be brought, the Court might have to address whether this prescription 
constituted, on the one hand, a regulation of individual or state activities, or, on 
the other hand, a regulation of the manner in which states regulate private 
parties.134  The answer to this question would not appear to be abortion-
dependent, but rather dependent upon overarching commitments to a federal-
state balance of power. 
The Court also could analyze the question of congressional authority to 
regulate state court jurisdiction in the way that it has analyzed questions of 
state sovereign immunity: by examining whether such a regulation would 
interfere with an incident of state sovereignty that the common law or law of 
nations recognized at the time of the Founding.  In Seminole Tribe of Florida 
v. Florida,135 the Court explained that state sovereign immunity has its roots 
“not solely in the common law of England, but in the much more fundamental 
‘jurisprudence in all civilized nations.’”136  Participants in ratification debates, 
members of the first Congresses, and state court judges during the Founding 
era and subsequent decades largely premised arguments about congressional 
 
 129. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. 
 130. New York, 505 U.S. at 178–79. 
 131. Printz, 521 U.S. at 907. 
 132. 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
 133. Id. at 150 (quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514–15 (1988)). 
 134. See Bellia, supra note 106, at 970–92 (analyzing state sovereignty issues, including anti-
commandeering issues, that the Court might face if Congress were to regulate state court 
procedures). 
 135. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 136. Id. at 69 (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17 (1890)) (citations omitted).  In Alden 
v. Maine, the Court rooted sovereign immunity more in English law than the law of nations.  527 
U.S. 706, 715–16 (1999). 
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power over state court jurisdiction on principles of sovereignty derived from 
the law of nations.137  Most notably, they premised arguments about whether 
Congress could require or even allow state courts to hear federal criminal cases 
on principles of the law of nations thought to inhere in the constitutional 
structure.138 
Today, historical arguments that Congress lacks power to regulate state 
court jurisdiction in state law cases might well identify incidents of sovereignty 
defined by the law of nations and argued by members of the Founding 
generation to limit congressional power.  Counterarguments might well reject 
such principles in favor of a process-based theory of American federalism—
one that views “procedural” or “political safeguards of federalism” as the 
primary, if not exclusive, check on federal power relative to state power.139  
Framed this way, the issue whether Congress has authority to enact choice-of-
forum laws for state courts in state law cases would depend on commitments to 
the balance of federal and state power, not the relative interests of states and 
individuals in the practice of abortion.  Regardless of the merits of these 
positions, normative claims about federalism would more likely drive the 
Court’s analysis than normative claims about the relative interests of a state in 
regulating women in procuring abortions.  In other words, the constitutional 
analysis of congressional power to provide a choice-of-forum rule to umpire 
state authority over abortion would most likely be non-abortion-dependent. 
C. Summary 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the possibility, if not the likelihood, 
that the Court would address most questions of federal authority to regulate 
abortion in a post-Roe world under rules or standards that are not abortion-
dependent.  The Court likely would resolve questions of congressional power 
to regulate abortion directly under the “substantial effects” test—a test 
concerned with the relationship between a regulated activity and commerce—
not with whether state regulation of abortion is inherently justified.  As for 
congressional regulation of state regulation of abortion, it is more difficult to 
identify the “test” the Court would invoke.  It seems safe to say, however, at 
least that the Court would review federal choice-of-forum rules in abortion 
cases under familiar Commerce Clause and state sovereignty paradigms—
paradigms that in terms implicate normative commitments to congressional 
 
 137. See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Congressional Power and State Court Jurisdiction, 
94 GEO. L.J. 949 (2006) (describing issues of congressional power and state court jurisdiction 
that were discussed during the Founding period and subsequent decades, and the general law 
principles that animated the discussions). 
 138. See id. at 966–90 (describing such arguments). 
 139. See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 
(1954); see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
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and state power, not the relative interests of government and individuals in the 
practice of abortion. 
III.  FEDERALISM DOCTRINES AND REGULATORY OUTCOMES 
As Parts I and II demonstrate, it is possible that, in a post-Roe world, 
abortion-dependent standards would govern most questions of state power to 
regulate abortion while non-abortion-dependent standards would govern most 
questions of federal power to regulate abortion.  Accordingly, the extent to 
which the controversial balancing of Roe and Casey would endure if the Court 
overruled those cases could depend on which political institutions sought to 
regulate abortion and how. 
It is interesting to ponder why state authority to regulate abortion might 
well implicate abortion-dependent standards while federal authority to regulate 
abortion might well implicate non-abortion-dependent standards.  Though a 
full exploration of this question is beyond the scope of this Essay, it is at least 
worth observing the differing roles the Court has identified for itself in 
assessing the regulatory authority of states and the federal government. 
In determining state authority to regulate relative to other states, the Court 
has long deemed some degree of “umpiring” discretion necessary.  Consider 
the standard that a plurality articulated in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague140 
(and the Court adopted in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts141) for determining 
when, consistent with the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses, a 
state may enforce its own laws: “[F]or a State’s substantive law to be selected 
in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant 
contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that 
choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”142  Implicit in 
this standard is the idea that, for any given set of facts generating a lawsuit, the 
laws of more than one state may constitutionally apply.143  The Court has 
acknowledged—even embraced—the degree of discretion that such an interest-
balancing standard contemplates for courts.  In determining whether any given 
state has “power” to apply its own laws to a given dispute relative to the power 
 
 140. 449 U.S. 302 (1981). 
 141. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
 142. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 312–13 (plurality opinion); see Shutts, 472 U.S. at 818 (invoking 
and applying the Allstate standard as the governing standard). 
 143. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 307 (“Implicit in this inquiry is the recognition, long accepted 
by this Court, that a set of facts giving rise to a lawsuit, or a particular issue within a lawsuit, may 
justify, in constitutional terms, application of the law of more than one jurisdiction.”); see also 
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 823 (“[W]e reaffirm our observation in Allstate that in many situations a state 
court may be free to apply one of several choices of law.”). 
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of another state,144 the Court in Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial 
Accident Commission145 found it “unavoidable” that a court “determine for 
itself the extent to which the statute of one state may qualify or deny rights 
asserted under the statute of another.”146  To make that determination, a court 
must “apprais[e] the governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turn[] the 
scale of decision according to their weight.”147 
The same could largely be said of the Court’s “negative” Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence.  To determine whether a state regulation impermissibly 
burdens interstate commerce (and thus out-of-state interests), the Court has 
embraced an open-ended, case-by-case analysis of state interests.  In West 
Lynn Creamery v. Healy,148 the Court explained its Dormant “Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence is not so rigid as to be controlled by the form by which a 
State erects barriers to commerce.  Rather [its] cases have eschewed formalism 
for a sensitive, case-by-case analysis of purposes and effects.”149  In this 
context, Justice Thomas has argued: 
Any test that requires us to assess (1) whether a particular statute serves a 
“legitimate” local public interest; (2) whether the effects of the statute on 
interstate commerce are merely “incidental” or “clearly excessive in relation to 
the putative benefits”; (3) the “nature” of the local interest; and (4) whether 
there are alternative means of furthering the local interest that have a “lesser 
impact” on interstate commerce, and even then makes the question “one of 
degree,” surely invites us, if not compels us, to function more as legislators 
than as judges.150 
It is perhaps unsurprising that those Justices who strongly eschew such 
discretionary balancing tests—Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia—have 
rejected an open-ended “negative” Commerce Clause and otherwise 
determined state regulatory authority relative to other states under more 
categorical tests.151 
 
 144. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930) (holding that Texas was “without 
power” to affect an insurance contract when “nothing in any way relating to the policy sued on, or 
to the contracts of reinsurance, was ever done or required to be done in Texas”). 
 145. 294 U.S. 533 (1935). 
 146. Id. at 547. 
 147. Id. 
 148. 512 U.S. 186 (1994). 
 149. Id. at 201. 
 150. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 619 (1997) 
(Thomas, J. dissenting). 
 151. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (reasoning, in the plurality 
opinion by Justice Scalia, that a state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person present in 
the court’s territorial jurisdiction under long-established, categorical practice); Sun Oil v. 
Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (reasoning, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, that a state may apply 
its own statute of limitations to claims otherwise governed by the law of another state under long-
established, categorical choice-of-law practices).  See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law 
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Contrast questions of federal authority to regulate, for which the Court 
recently has eschewed tests calling for discretionary determinations of 
governmental “interests” in the particular subject-matter of a dispute.  To 
determine whether Congress has regulated “commerce” under its Article I 
powers, the Court has employed the “substantial effects” test: Congress may 
“regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ 
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”152  Though critics have 
charged that this test is malleable and expansive, the test, by its terms, does not 
call upon a court to determine the nature and strength of any inherent federal 
interest in regulating a particular activity.  Rather, the test calls upon the court 
to determine how a regulated activity relates to interstate commerce.  Thus, 
though the test appears to give wide berth to courts in classifying activities as 
“economic” or aggregating a relevant “class of activities,” the ultimate inquiry 
is how regulated activity relates to commerce, not what inherent interest 
Congress may have in regulating the activity. 
In determining the scope of federal power, not only has the Court not 
assessed inherent federal interests in regulating a given activity; it has 
generally rejected a test that would limit federal power according to whether 
there exist inherent state interests in regulating that activity.  In National 
League of Cities v. Usery,153 the Court struck down a federal statute regulating 
wages and hours of state employees on the ground that it would 
“impermissibly interfere with the integral governmental functions” of states.154  
Nine years later, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,155 
the Court overruled Usery, rejecting the “traditional state functions” test.  The 
Court provided two main reasons for refusing to limit federal power based on 
the existence of a “traditional” or “integral” state interest in the regulated 
activities.156  First, it found the test “unworkable” in practice.157  The Court 
found it “difficult, if not impossible, to identify an organizing principle” 
rendering certain state functions integral and others not so.158  Second, the 
Court found that no test that “purports to separate out important governmental 
functions” for purposes of defining federal regulatory power “can be faithful to 
the role of federalism in a democratic society.”159  “Any rule of state immunity 
that looks to the ‘traditional,’ ‘integral,’ or ‘necessary’ nature of governmental 
 
as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (arguing for “general rules” rather than 
“personal discretion” in judicial decision-making). 
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functions,” the Court found, “inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary 
to make decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it 
dislikes.”160  Accordingly, the Court rejected any limitation on federal 
regulatory power based on a state’s “integral” or “traditional” interest in 
regulating a given area in favor of a process-based theory of federalism.  Under 
Garcia’s process-based theory, the political safeguards of federalism inherent 
in the federal lawmaking procedures that the Constitution provides are 
generally sufficient to protect the interests of the states under the American 
constitutional structure.161 
Of course, the Court has not fully embraced procedural and political 
safeguards as the sole safeguards of state interests and autonomy under the 
American Constitution.  In New York and Printz, the Court held that Congress 
may not commandeer state legislatures and executive officials to enact or 
enforce federal law.162  In Seminole Tribe and Alden, the Court held that 
Congress lacks power to subject states to suit in federal or state court based on 
principles of state sovereign immunity.163  Indeed, in United States v. Lopez164 
and United States v. Morrison,165 cases in which the Court held that certain 
congressional regulations of guns near schools and acts of sexual violence 
against women were beyond the commerce power, the Court noted that the 
respective regulations were in areas that states traditionally regulated.  In 
Lopez, the Court explained that if Congress could regulate guns near schools, it 
could, by extension, generally regulate “areas such as criminal law 
enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign.”166  
Similarly, in Morrison, the Court explained that “[t]he regulation and 
punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, 
channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always been the 
province of the States.”167 
Even if one reads these cases as embracing concepts of “traditional state 
functions” (notwithstanding Garcia), none assessed the propriety of federal 
regulation as being based on a state’s interest in a particular regulatory 
outcome.  Rather, in each case, the touchstone of the Court’s reasoning was 
that Congress had violated a federalism principle transcending state or federal 
interests in particular regulatory outcomes.  In the anti-commandeering and 
sovereign immunity cases, the Court held categorically that Congress may not 
 
 160. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546. 
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require states to enact or enforce any federal regulatory program or authorize 
any private action against a state unless a provision of the Constitution 
expressly authorizes Congress to do so.  In the Commerce Clause cases, the 
Court assessed whether Congress was regulating a sufficiently “economic” 
activity that “substantially affected” commerce.  The point in explaining that 
Congress was regulating in an area that states traditionally regulated was that 
states have a prerogative to regulate as they wish, not that any state had 
demonstrated a sufficiently strong interest in regulating as it had. 
Therein lies the difference between how the Court might well assess 
questions of federal constitutional power to regulate abortion and state 
constitutional power to regulate abortion.  In assessing questions of state power 
to regulate abortion, the doctrines available to the Court may well lead it to 
assess a state’s interest in regulating abortion in a particular way.  As Professor 
Fallon points out, a general conflict-of-laws “interest analysis” might lead a 
court to assess the strength of a state’s interest in regulating abortion as the 
state has regulated it.168  In assessing questions of congressional power under 
the Commerce Clause, on the other hand, the Court has asked whether 
Congress has power relative to principles that transcend federal and state 
interests in particular regulatory outcomes. 
The relevance of these observations to the question of what the judicial 
role would be in cases relating to abortion in a post-Roe world is evident.  In 
cases involving state regulation of abortion, governing standards (and the 
Court’s self-identified role in applying those standards) could enable the Court 
to make assessments regarding a state’s inherent interest in regulating the 
practice of abortion in particular ways.  In cases involving federal regulation of 
abortion, governing standards (and the Court’s self-identified role in applying 
those standards) could limit the Court to assessing relative federal and state 
power according to positive markers unrelated to the inherent interest of any 
government in regulating abortion in a particular way. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Fallon is surely correct that, were the Court to overrule Roe v. 
Wade, political actors within the federal system could take regulatory actions 
that would generate constitutional questions relating to abortion.169  This Essay 
merely proposes a refinement on that analysis. Under current federalism 
doctrines, questions relating to state power to regulate abortion may well 
involve assessments of the legitimacy of state interests in regulating abortion in 
particular ways.  On the other hand, questions relating to federal power to 
regulate abortion might well involve assessments of the balance of federal and 
state power based on interests that transcend the perceived worth of particular 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
796 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:767 
regulatory outcomes.  Thus, whether post-Roe courts would remain involved in 
deciding questions of the legitimacy of governmental interests in regulating 
abortion in particular ways may well depend on the kind of governmental 
regulation that emerged in a post-Roe world. 
 
